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New Media as Social Facts:
Researching as Shaping the
Digital Landscape
James Cornford
Introduction: researchers and new media
By the end of the twentieth century, media studies research within
developed western societies had entered a middle-aged, stodgy period
and wasn’t really sure what it could say about things any more.
Thank goodness the Web came along (Gauntlett, 2000: 3).
The emergence of new media (or digital media, or perhaps even ‘the new economy’)
has certainly had some salutary effects on media studies. The advent of the Web has
raised (or re-raised) a whole set of interesting questions for those concerned with
researching various aspects of the media from those concerned with political economy
and industrial organisation to those concerned with reception, interpretations and texts.
Digital media frequently appear, even in the most sober accounts, to be some
unstoppable tidal wave of change, a complex and multi-layered landscape moving so fast
that researchers can only rush to try to keep up with its myriad implications and
perturbations throughout society. This paper is concerned to break down that image, to
try to show that its basic categories – digital media, developing quickly, researchers
rushing to catch up – are, if not false, at least questionable. What I want to argue is that
the researchers do not simply react, belatedly to the emergence of digital media, but that
they have an active role in shaping its development. At the end of this essay I want to
draw out some of the more practical implications of this point of view.
I want to begin, however, with a detour through some of the history of the Sociology
of Knowledge.
Social Facts
If men define situations as real, they are real in their consequences
(WI Thomas quoted in Merton, 1957: 421)
The urge to write this paper comes from a growing dissatisfaction or sense of unease
on my part with much of the literature on ‘new media’ (including some of my own
contributions). Almost co-incidentally, I have been trying to get up to speed with the
sociology of knowledge and Science and Technology Studies (STS). What I want to do
here is to try to use some of the basic concepts from the sociology of knowledge and STS
to analyse just what it is that makes me feel uneasy about so much writing about ‘new
media’. 
The founding principle of the sociology of knowledge is, perhaps, the notion of the
‘social fact’. This idea is most closely associated with Robert K Merton, although as
Merton was at pains to point out, it is an observation that we can find in Mandeville,
Marx or Freud, among others. Merton addressed the concept in an article called the ‘self
fulfilling prophesy’ which he describes thus:
A self-fulfilling  prophesy is, in the beginning, a false definition of the
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situation evoking a new behaviour which makes the originally false
perception come true (Merton, 1957: 423)
Merton’s classic example of a self fulfilling prophesy was a run on a bank – if enough
depositors heard that the bank was going to become insolvent, and acted on that
rumour by taking their money out of the bank, then the bank would indeed become
insolvent. Merton’s second example concerned the relationship between ethnic groups in
the United States. White workers, he suggested, saw black workers as dis-organised and
un-unionised, prone to being used as strike breakers and, as a result of lower living
standards, driving down wage rates. Acting on these beliefs, they excluded black
workers from unions, and thus from many employment opportunities, driving black
workers to accept lower wages and jobs in strike bound companies and excluding them
from any opportunity to experience union organisation. 
The sociologist Donald McKenzie (2000) has recently reminded us that such self
fulfilling prophesies need not be socially pathological, nor need the prophesy be, in the
beginning at least, ‘false’. Indeed, fundamental social categories, such as money, are
utterly reliant on widespread belief in their efficacy – a point that can be seen most
clearly when, exceptionally, they break down (e.g., in the event of hyper inflation).
Indeed, elsewhere Merton points to the ‘Copernican revolution’ in the Sociology of
Knowledge as being the realisation that 
not only error or illusion or unauthenticated belief but also the
discovery of truth was socially (historically) conditioned (1957: 459).
Indeed the extension of this position, the notion that the same explanatory schema
should be used to describe how true and false knowledge arise, has become one of the
key prescriptions of the so-called ‘strong programme’ in the sociology of knowledge. 
One of the key targets of the Strong Programme is the notion of a “fact”. Studies of
large technical systems and of laboratory sciences (e.g., Hughes, 1998; Latour, 1998),
for example, have pointed to the complex networks which produce and sustain facts –
for example, the “fact” that large central plant power generation is most efficient and the
“fact” of bacteria. 
A fact can thus be seen as the assertion of power(s) by a range of human and non-
human actors to make some claim into a “fact” about the world – in the terms of
Latour’s actor-network approach, to make the network that sustains the fact ‘act as
one’, a black box. Much of the work of STS, then, is the careful unpicking of the various
threads of the networks that sustain facts, of revealing how they are contingent on a
wider network that is hidden in the black box of facticity. 
How can these founding insights of the sociology of the last century, and their
development in STS, be applied to the field of new media? I want to start by unpicking
one key, new media fact. My aim is not dispute the retrospective truth of the fact of
rapid internet growth but rather to reveal some of the network of people and texts that
support it. I then want to go on to show how this fact, far from standing outside that
which it describes, acts to support its own contention, that it is a social fact.
The eclipse of all other technologies
No invention of modern times has extended its influence so rapidly
as the electric telegraph (Scientific American, 1852 quoted in
Standage, 1998)
One of the few facts about the internet to go almost uncontested is that it is “the
fastest growing communication medium of all time”. And as the quote above from the
Scientific American in 1852 demonstrates, it is not the first communications technology
to claim that status. The sheer amount of repetition of this fact should, I think, make
one uneasy. How can we trace out some of the strands of argument, the network, which
sustains this almost universally accepted fact? 
The earliest version of the claim that I can find appears in the well known
commentator Bruce Sterling’s influential ‘Short history of the Internet’ which, in 1993,
averred that
The Internet’s pace of growth in the early 1990s is spectacular,
almost ferocious. It is spreading faster than cellular phones, faster
than fax machines. Last year the Internet was growing at a rate of
twenty percent a month. The number of “host” machines with direct
connection to TCP/IP has been doubling every year since 1988. The
Internet is moving out of its original base in military and research
institutions, into elementary and high schools, as well as into public
libraries and the commercial sector (Sterling, 1993)
However, the more recent, more influential and widely cited source is a report from
the US Department of Commerce. Here we find the assertion in what we might call its
classic form.
The Internet’s pace of adoption eclipses all other technologies that
preceded it. Radio was in existence 38 years before 50 million people
tuned in; TV took 13 years to reach that benchmark. Sixteen years
after the first PC kit came out, 50 million people were using one.
Once it was opened to the general public, the Internet crossed that
line in four years. (US Dept of Commerce, 1998) 
More recently still we can find this claim all over the internet in a variety of settings:
The Internet is growing faster than any single technology in history,
far faster than the railroad, electric light, telephone, or television,
and it is only getting started. (Bradner, 2000)
Today the Internet is growing at a faster rate than any previous
technology – faster than the telephone, than electricity, than
television grew when they were introduced. (Pritkin, 2000)
The Internet is the fastest growing communication medium of all
time, increasing far faster than its predecessors - television, radio,
telephone and fax. It took 38 years before 50 million Americans were
listening to radio. Television reached that many in only 14 years,
however, the Internet had reached that number in just four years.
(Oxford Branch of the British Computer Society,
http://www.bcsoxon.org/past2000.htm)
Already one can see that there is some truth in the contention of copyright holders
that the Internet is ‘the biggest copying machine in the world’.
Let us explore this almost ubiquitous fact. Where does this fact come from? The US
Dept of Commerce Report, a key source for many of its subsequent appearances, cites a
report by Mary Meeker and Sharon Pearson for Morgan Stanley U.S. Investment
Research: Internet Retail (Morgan Stanley, 1997: 2-2, 2-6) and goes on to note some of
the assumptions underpinning its claim (for example, the fact that the data used for TV
and other media are U.S. figures while the PC figures reflect worldwide users). Turning
to the Meeker and Pearson report itself, the claim is rather more qualified. The critical
text and, very importantly, the associated graph, are on page 2-2. The text, beneath a
heading of ‘Internet adoption is happening faster than in other media’, reads: ‘We believe
that the internet has surpassed all of these [other media] in its rate of adoption’
(emphasis added). Rather tellingly, the foot of each page of the report bears the following
inscription: 
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This memorandum is based on information available to the public.
No representation is made that it is accurate or complete.
The centrepiece of the Meeker and Pearson’s report however is a graph comparing the
diffusion curves for radio, TV, Cable (see Figure 1). Adoption curves, a commonplace of
technology diffusion studies, are generally seen as being S shaped and based on a
broadly normal distribution of propensity to adopt with a few early adopter, a larger
cohort of mainstream adopters, a small rump of late adopters (for a discussion of
diffusion theory with respect to information and communication technologies see Mansell
and Steinmueller, 2000: 104ff.). It is worth noting, however, that when Meeker and
Pearson’s report was published, they did not have data for internet adoption beyond the
end of 1996 and they argue in the text (para. 2-3) that ‘we believe that there are currently
30-35 million Internet users’. A footnote to the graph points out that the estimate for
when the Internet curve will cross the magic line indicating 50 Million users is in fact a
‘Morgan Stanley Technology Research Estimate’. Thus, at the time the report was
published, there was no actual evidence that the 50 million mark had yet been achieved.
Meeker and Pearson’s graph is also attempting to make a further claim based on the
comparison of diffusion curves for different media to show that the internet is diffusing
faster than previous domestic communications technologies. This claim can be
challenged on a number of counts. For example, as Larry Press (2000) has pointed out,
while ‘some claim the Internet is growing more rapidly than earlier information
technologies like radio or television,… such claims depend upon the choice of a starting
date for the Internet and the definitions of growth measures’ (Press, 2000). Let us start
with the first of these two observations. 
It is clear that the time taken to achieve the magic number of 50 million Americans is
highly sensitive to the chosen starting dates and the criteria by which we choose them.
Should this be the ‘first’ American internet user? Or should it be the first ‘commercial’
internet user? In what year was the internet ‘opened to the general public’? A wide range
of available dates can, of course, be suggested (for a useful account with a fuller set of
possible dates see Kitchen 1998). 
The problems multiply when we move to the comparative nature of these statements.
For example, the arbitrary choice of ‘50 million Americans’ as the benchmark figure
becomes problematic in the context of the inter-temporal dimensions of the implied
comparison. The original Morgan Stanley report stated that, ‘Although these numbers
are not adjusted for population growth, it is clear to us that the adoption rates for new
media have accelerated over time — TV was faster than radio, cable came on even faster
(despite the new infrastructure it required that previous broadcast media did not), and
we believe that the Internet has surpassed all of these in its rate of adoption’ (1997:
para. 2.2). Leaving aside the issue of why Americans are seen as the benchmark
community, we can raise questions about the figure of 50 million. According to the US
Census, the US population was 62,116,811 in 1890, long after the telegraph boom. By
1997 the estimate was 266,490,000, after growing by 18 million in the period between
1990 and 1997 (US Dept of Commerce/Bureau of the Census, 1998: 6; see also the
superb US Census browser at http://fisher.lib.virginia.edu/census/). As a proportion of
the US population, of course, 50 million is a far less impressive percentage of 266
million (around 18%) than it is of 122 million (41%) or 62 million (80%). The comparison
between media looks very different if we choose, not the arbitrary figure of 50 million,
but a proportion of the US population, say 20 per cent. Our target figures for the
telegraph might be a mere 12 million users and for radio or the television more like 24
million. In this context, the growth of the internet appears much more modest.
I want to focus on yet another problem with these comparisons. To make such a
comparison is to treat each of the elements, or to suggest that each of the elements
should be treated, as discrete or unrelated. This is quite clearly not the case for internet
access. What the comparison effaces is the differences between the various media. Now,
what is important is that the internet is wholly reliant on earlier rounds of technology
investment – the internet curve builds on the earlier curves. For example, as Michael
Minges has pointed out:
Telephone lines and personal computers are key components for
Internet access. Both have significant impact on the take-up of
Internet in a country. Dial-up Internet access requires a telephone
line and a personal computer (with a modem). These hardware
components thus constitute an upper limit for Internet access. For
example, if 25 percent of households have personal computers with
modems, then Internet access from households cannot exceed 25
percent. Pro-Internet policies will not be successful if they do not
address these fundamental access requirements. (Minges, 2000)
What is more, we can push this analysis further. The earlier technologies were
obliged to finance the construction of huge infrastructures, substantially, if not totally,
from scratch. 
Here I want to use the notion of infrastructure developed by Susan Leigh Star and
Karen Ruhleder (1996). For Star and Ruhelder, the question is not what is an
infrastructure but when is an infrastructure. For them, the nature of infrastructure is
relational. What is infrastructure for you may not be for me, and what is regarded as
infrastructure changes over time. What is more, the classic feature of an infrastructure
is that it does not draw attention to itself, usually it just works (which is why its
infrastructural nature is revealed when it breaks down and why it is so easy for Meeker
and Pearson to ignore the infrastructural basis of rapid internet adoption). In short,
infrastructure is the taken for granted. To the cook, turning on the tap to get water for
cooking is using an infrastructure. She does not even think of the pipes, regulators,
pumps, and filtration plants and reservoirs, coupled with billing systems and so on. For
the waterboard engineer, however, these things are the very stuff of action and not at all
infrastructural. One advantage of the Star and Ruhelder understanding of infrastructure
is that it doesn’t limit us to an infrastructure of things, but can be extended to include
‘social infrastructure’ – the taken for granted dispositions and ways of behaving of
people and groups that become apparent mainly when they break down. And once
again, this is dependent on context and position. What is infrastructural from one
social, personal, spatial or temporal perspective is certainly not from another. 
Let us return to communications infrastructures. For the telegraph network to
develop, wires had to be strung between every telegraph office which was to be
connected and vast numbers of telegraph operators had to be recruited and trained,
property had to be acquired to house them, and a local delivery network had to be
constructed for telegrams to reach private residences and offices. The telephone, while
able to build on some of this network (and replace other aspects) required new space for
operators (exchanges), and customers had to rent or buy customer premises equipment,
complex billing systems had to be developed and so on. For radio broadcasting, a
network of radio masts had to be created, together with the cables to link them together.
Studios for broadcasting and recording were created and customers had to purchase
radio sets (and, in many countries, licences). Subsequent technologies have, of course,
built on many of these “infrastructures” – television, for example, built on the network of
transmission sites it inherited from radio, although it still had to construct new
transmitters and a different type of distribution network to feed those transmitters.
Further, and unlike radio, television or telephone, the internet, at least in its current
form, builds on the development of mass literacy over the last 300 years. 
My point is that what is infrastructure for the internet – taken for granted services,
objects and behaviours – was not so for earlier technologies. (Interestingly, Meeker and
Pearson, do allude to this matter, but in a rather confusing way by pointing to the
substantial conventional infrastructure required by cable, which they confusingly
contrast with ‘previous broadcast media’ which they claim did not require new
infrastructure.)
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The internet was able to grow so fast, at least in part because it could use these
invisible infrastructures, above all the ‘last mile’ of the public switched telephone
network and the installed base of home computers. To be an early adopter of television,
the consumer had to spend very significant sums of money (relative to average earnings)
on a television set and a licence. To be an early adopter of the internet, a household that
already had a personal computer and telephone line, needed only to buy a modem and
subscribe to an ISP. The comparison implied in the claim that “The Internet is the
fastest growing communication medium of all time” is therefore a difficult one.
Facts in the World
So far I have simply tried to show that what is regularly taken as an established fact
about the internet is less straight forward than one might think and that, at the time it
was put forward, rested on a mixture of assertion, estimates, and beliefs, coupled with
some questionable inter-temporal comparisons. One response to this has been to argue
for better Internet statistics, less shaped by the needs of business plans and embodying
more rigour (see for example, Jordan, 2001). Here I want to take another tack and move
from examining the network which has sustained that the claim for the unprecedented
fast growth of the internet, to the effects of that claim in the world. Specifically, I want to
suggest that the rapid growth of the internet is, in part, a ‘social fact. That is to say, the
fact that claims about the rapid growth of the internet are believed and acted on by
investors, companies and consumers, lead them to invest in and adopt the internet and
therefore render those claims correct. Of course, to make this thesis stick we would have
to show how the belief that internet adoption is growing fast encourages internet
adoption. While the economics of networks would suggest that that would not be an
unreasonable thesis, we obviously need some more substantial evidence.
First, we can return to Mary Meeker, author of the Morgan Stanley report which we
met before. Meeker has been a well known figure in the field of financing internet-based
activity, for some, ‘the Queen of the Internet’. For example Network World (01/04/1999)
identified her as one of the ‘25 most powerful people in networking’, while Wired News
(21/12/1998) opined that ‘when Mary Meeker speaks, markets move’. Her reputation in
the late 1990s was as a highly bullish analyst of the internet. In an interview with
Business Week (16/9/1999) the following exchange occurred
BW: How would you describe your contribution so far? 
Meeker: I’d prefer to have you or someone else answer this question!
I’d like to think that the folks at Morgan Stanley and I helped create
important, insightful, and credible playbooks for the evolution of
Internet businesses and that we helped legitimize the financing of
Internet companies with early, critical, and aggressive financings for
especially successful companies such as America Online, Netscape,
excite@home, and Amazon.com. And, importantly, while I have
certainly had my share of screwups, so far [over the past decade] we
have been on a ride with our stocks and investors for hundreds of
billions in market capitalization appreciation.
At Meeker’s own estimate, her role has been in creating and supporting the
necessary financing for many Internet retailing companies, including some of the largest
and most widely known. Much of this finance was dedicated to marketing the internet to
US (and other) households. Meeker, Pearson and Morgan Stanley were by no means
mere observers of the development of the internet – they were crucial players in
channelling money into its development. The Internet Retail Report and above all the
memorable and much copied graph, were crucial instruments in enabling them to play
that role.
The crash in the share price of most internet-related stocks (including Meeker
favourites, such as Yahoo, Amazon and Ebay) has, of course, significantly undermined
the authority of Meeker and Morgan Stanley. By 2001, the internet trade journal The
Industry Standard (274/2001) was headlining an article ‘Mary Meeker Speaks, But
Probably Shouldn’t’, describing the analyst as ‘Missing In Action’. However, she remains
a long term internet enthusiast, subsequently being quoted in the industry magazine
Red Herring (15/06/2001) as saying ‘We will likely go through more bad times before we
get to “normal times.” That said, we reiterate our view that we continue to be upbeat
about the underlying secular global growth for Internet users, uses, and usage.’
Although Morgan Stanley, successfully defended a class action in 2001 from aggrieved
investors in internet stocks which had been boosted by Meeker’s reports, the US
Securities and Exchange Commission has begun an enquiry into the flotation of
lastminute.com, focusing on Meeker’s role (Walsh 2002). 
In this story, however, Mary Meeker is, perhaps, less important than the report
which she helped to author – it is the report which is the real actor. In spite of the
revelations about the linkages between the research and investment banking business
of Wall Street companies such as Morgan Stanley, the report remains (as of June 2002)
on the Morgan Stanley website. However, the impact of the report was perhaps most
powerfully amplified by its take up by the US Department of Commerce in its E-
commerce report. It is the Department of Commerce formulation that is most widely
found on the internet. A quick search on Google.com for ‘took radio 38 years 13
Television Internet 50 million’ returns over 40,000 pages from companies, voluntary
organisations and universities, the vast majority of which contain a version of the
Department of Commerce’s version of the fact.
Another way of beginning to test the thesis that rapid internet adoption is, in part, a
social fact is to see what happens to counter claims – those who argue that the internet
is not straightforwardly growing fast. Here my evidence comes from the UK ESRC’s
Virtual Society? (VS?) Programme. Sally Wyatt prepared a conference paper, publicised
on the VS? website, entitled ‘They came, they surfed, they went back to the beach: why
some people stop using the internet’ (1999). Wyatt pointed to the results of American
researchers (Katz and Aspden, 1998) who had included the category of ‘former internet
user’ in their questionnaires ‘for conceptual clarity’. Much to their surprise, their survey
suggested that as many as 8 per cent of their sample fell into that category. Further, the
study had found that it was teenagers who were most likely to be former users. Wyatt’s
paper was drawn on in a presentation by the Virtual Society? Director, Steve Woolgar, in
a meeting with UK journalists at a Press Lunch in London on 29 November 2000. Some
of the subsequent media furore is detailed on the Virtual Society? Web pages
(http://virtualsociety.sbs.ox.ac.uk/reports/media.htm). Many of the media sources
sought to rubbish, or contradict the research. The most spectacular over-reaction
however, came from Channel 4 News which announced that “although some researchers
are saying that no one is using the Internet, in fact Channel 4 can reveal that lots of
people are still using it” and proceeded to interview a number of teenage users of the
internet!
Conclusion: Reflexivity and Responsibility in (New) Media Research
My purpose in all of this has not been to suggest that the internet is not (was not?)
growing fast. Rather what I have tried to show is that the widespread belief in the claim
that the internet is growing fast, indeed faster than all previous media, is part of the
reason that it is growing fast. In short, I have tried to show that the rapid growth of the
internet is, in part, a social fact.
I have focused on the fact of the growth of the internet, but my argument should not
be seen as restricted to this one aspect of the development of the digital media
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landscape. To give just one brief example, I could have focused on the claimed
propensity of digital media to ‘cluster’ together in ‘Silicon Alleys’. Here too we have the
necessary ingredients for a social fact – that is to say one that is widely believed by
policy makers who act to support it with incubator units, networking events, managed
workspace and all kinds of inducements and support. In this context too, it is difficult to
distinguish between representation and effect.
I am reminded in all this of a study by Michel Callon (1998), sociologist of science
and technology, of an electronic strawberry auction in France. As Callon noted, the
strawberry auction appeared to work as an almost ideal market according to the
economics textbooks. For the economist, it was a kind of proof of the adequacy of
economics leaving nothing ‘sociological’ for the sociologist to explain. Yet on closer
examination, Callon makes clear that part of the reason why the market operated in this
way was that it was carefully constructed to do so. It had, indeed been designed by a
trained economist who had sought to ensure that the market conformed to the neo-
classical ideal (separation and anonymity of buyers and sellers, standardised
descriptions of goods through the grading of strawberry quality, price oriented
information flows). It was, thus, no great surprise to find that the constructed reality
reflected the textbook because the textbook had been instrumental in its design.
Callon has used this example to remind us that the relationship between the
discipline of economics and the “real” economy is a complex one, in which the discipline
of economics does not stand outside of and reflect on the workings of the economy, but
in which it is an essential part of the network of things, people, practices and principles
that make up the economy. ‘We should not forget,’ he writes, ‘the essential contribution
of economics in the performing of the economy’ (Callon, 1998: 23). Thus, for example, he
suggests, 
Homo economicus does exist, but is not an a-historical reality; he
does not describe the hidden nature of the human being. He is a
result of a process of configuration (Callon, 1998: 22)
This configuration involves a wide range of elements, but crucially, it also requires
economic theory. In the same manner, we might suggest that the rapid growth of the
internet does exist, but it too is no outward expression of some technological or
industrial logic inherent in the “nature” of the internet. It too, is a result of
configuration. And again, it is one in which research makes an essential contribution.
If I am right, and the proliferation and recycling of the notion of the rapid
development of the internet is an important part of the process of bringing about exactly
that outcome, then this has important implications for media researchers. We cannot
see ourselves as outside of the digital media landscape, mere observers and measurers
of its dimensions. Rather we are deeply implicated within it. What we choose to focus
on, highlight, or recycle can have real effects, perhaps more so in the field of digital
media, where change is perceived as so rapid and there is so little certainty around,
than in other fields. Even if our research does not have the same impacts as Mary
Meeker’s, researchers play a powerful role in shaping the digital media landscape.
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Figure1
(Source: Morgan Stanley Dean Witter, 1997)
